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COMMUNICATION
THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR
ADMINISTRATION, THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND
THE SACHSENHAUSEN CASE, 1964–1968
GLEN O ’HARA
Oxford Brookes University
A B S T R ACT. This communication follows the evolution, reception, and implications of the parliamentary
commissioner’s critical 1968 report on Foreign Oﬃce ‘maladministration ’ regarding compensation for
British concentration camp inmates. It explores oﬃcials’ and ministers’ attitude to the investigative techni-
ques associated with this new oﬃce, as well as their hostile reaction to the publicity and parliamentary
controversy to which his work gave rise. It concludes by exploring the wider implications of the case,
especially the inherent problems faced by governments seeking closer and more harmonious relationships with
the governed.
I
In 1967 Harold Wilson’s Labour government created the new oﬃce of ‘parlia-
mentary commissioner for administration’ (PCA), partly modelled on the
Scandinavian-style ombudsmen or grievance oﬃcials that had recently been
adopted by New Zealand. It was hoped that this innovation would provide a
counter-balance to a much larger, more ambitious, and in Wilson’s words more
‘purposive ’ state that would inevitably be more intrusive in the lives of individuals.
Allowing a novel avenue for complaints might help to link people and parliament
more closely together.1 But within a year the parliamentary commissioner, Sir
Edmund Compton, was involved in a pitched battle with civil servants and
ministers alike. This concerned the vexed question of compensation for Second
World War prisoners, and eventually became an explosive admixture of class,
competence, reputation, and military experience. The ‘Sachsenhausen case ’, as
it became known, was ‘by far the most celebrated case yet investigated by the
Parliamentary Commissioner ’, as Roy Gregory and Peter Hutchesson wrote in
Department of History, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford OX3 0BP glen.ohara@brookes.ac.uk
1 See e.g. K. Theakston, The Labour party and Whitehall (London, 1992), pp. 171–3.
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the mid-1970s.2 G. K. Fry once wrote that, whatever else the ombudsman had
achieved, Sachsenhausen was his ‘critical breakthrough’.3
A number of secondary treatments of the case are already available, for
instance the semi-oﬃcial history The ombudsman, the citizen and parliament, published
in 2002.4 However, Gregory and Hutchesson’s near-contemporary account had
no access to government documents at all, while Gregory and Giddings’s afore-
mentioned Citizen and parliament was able to scrutinize cabinet-level papers, but
not departmental ﬁles. This means that the section on Sachsenhausen was written
almost entirely from publicly available reports and parliamentary debates. Other
accounts, for instance that of the Australian-born legal scholar K. C. Wheare in
the 1970s, and the reﬂections of the present ombudsman, Ann Abraham, are
relatively brief.5 Only Susanna Schrafstetter’s work has really made good use of
the raw material now available in the archives, and her focus has been on both
international negotiations for compensation and the British public’s bitterness
about the German contribution to the compensation regime overall.6 This
communication, on the other hand, will be more closely interested in the British
government’s reaction to the inquiry. It will therefore draw on newly available
documents at The National Archives and elsewhere as a means of disinterring
one example of the electorate’s troubled and uncertain relationship with the state
after 1945.
I I
In 1964, the West German government agreed to pay £1 m in compensation
for ‘British victims of measures of Nazi persecution’.7 It then became imperative
for Whitehall to ﬁnd a basis to share out this sum, the generosity of which
had been limited by UK representatives’ wish to settle the issue and the
compromise ﬁgure of 2,000 possible British claimants. The Conservative foreign
secretary, Rab Butler, decided to narrow the scheme’s range down to save
money: to what Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials later codiﬁed as ‘detention under a
certain set of circumstances typiﬁed by the concentration camp’. Simply being ill-
treated, or held in poor conditions in a prisoner of war camp, would therefore not
2 The best secondary account of this case is R. Gregory and P. Hutchesson, The parliamentary
ombudsman: a study in the control of administrative action (London, 1975), pp. 416–25.
3 G. K. Fry, The administrative ‘ revolution ’ in Whitehall (London, 1981), p. 173.
4 R. Gregory and P. Giddings, The ombudsman, the citizen and parliament (London, 2002), pp. 159–72.
5 K. C. Wheare, Maladministration and its remedies : the Hamlyn lectures (London, 1973), pp. 125–6, 132,
157 ; A. Abraham, ‘The ombudsman as part of the UK constitution: a contested role? ’, Parliamentary
Aﬀairs, 61, 1 (2008), esp. pp. 214–15.
6 S. Schrafstetter. ‘ ‘‘Gentlemen, the cheese is all gone! ’’ British POWs, the ‘‘great escape’’ and the
Anglo-German agreement for compensation to victims of Nazism’, Contemporary European History, 17,
1 (2008), esp. pp. 41–3.
7 House of Commons debates, ﬁfth series (hereafter H. of C. debs.), vol. 696, col. 242, Butler statement,
9 June 1964.
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qualify.8 But there were signs of trouble with this solution to the problem even at
this early stage. The long-serving Conservative MP Dame Irene Ward asked
Butler when he came to brief the back-bench Foreign Aﬀairs Committee
‘how widely the phrase ‘‘National Socialist measures of persecution’’ was to be
interpreted ’. Butler answered that ‘ the decisive factor would be the treatment
they had suﬀered ’ – not at all the rules as they eventually emerged in 1965.9
Twelve inmates of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp – or their families –
were refused compensation under these rules. The men had been imprisoned
there for a multitude of reasons. Among them were Group Captain Harry Day,
Flight-Lieutenant Sydney Dowse, Major J. B. ‘ Johnny’ Dodge and Flight-
Lieutenant Bertram James, all serial escapees, though Dodge had died by the
time the compensation issue was opened. The Germans thought that Captain
Peter Churchill and Lieutenant-Colonel John Churchill might be relatives of the
British prime minister ; Captain Sigismund Payne Best and Lieutenant-Colonel
Richard Stevens had been kidnapped as intelligence oﬃcers on the Dutch border
in 1939; the Nazis suspected Lieutenant-Colonel John McGrath of ‘ trying to
frustrate German eﬀorts to recruit Irish prisoners as defectors ’, though he had
died shortly after the war. Four Irish soldiers captured on duty with UK forces
(Cushing, Walsh, O’Brien, and Spence) held with him had indeed been prepared
for just such operations before the Germans changed their minds about using
them for inﬁltration activities. O’Brien was also dead by the time of Compton’s
investigations.10
Oﬃcials based these decisions on what they thought was ﬁrm evidence. Peter
Churchill’s memoir, Spirit in the cage, gave the impression that he had been held in
the Sonderlager at one remove from the ‘main camp’, since he had written of his
surprise at being held in a separate ‘pine-tree-studded enclosure of some eighty
yards in length by perhaps thirty in width in which stood two low wooden
huts … this haven could not possibly be for me’.11 It was on this basis that oﬃcials
wrote the initial notes for ministers, pointing out that the ex-premier of France
Le´on Blum and his wife, and the German central banker Hjalmar Schacht, had
also been held in the Sonderlager. The Britons held there had, furthermore, been
provided with ‘Cambert cheeses, tins of pilchards, organs, lemons, caviare [sic],
etc. ’.12
Captain Best, indeed, accepted that his cell in the Zellenbau punishment blocks
or ‘bunker ’ ‘was a sheltered haven of peace’ compared to the horrors he would
sometimes witness outside – though he made quite clear that he was inside what
8 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (TNA), FCO 64/54, Foreign Oﬃce mem-
orandum, ‘What Is nazi persecution?’, n.d. but 1964.
9 Conservative party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CRD 3/10/15, Conservative Foreign
Aﬀairs Committee, minutes, 10 June 1964
10 TNA, FCO 64/60, Samuel to Rodgers, 19 Jan. 1968.
11 P. Churchill, The spirit in the cage (London, 1954), pp. 126–7.
12 TNA, FCO 64/67, Foreign Oﬃce memorandum, ‘Scheme to compensate UK victims of Nazi
persecution’, 6 July 1965.
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he considered to be the main gates, and walking around Sachsenhausen ‘proper ’,
throughout his ﬁve years of incarceration.13 Statements given by Dowse, Day, and
Dodge on their liberation in 1945 also suggested that they had been held at one
remove from the main compound, and – although shackled – not particularly ill-
treated otherwise.14
The Sachsenhausen claimants were understandably furious at their treatment,
and Day, Dowse, Best, and Lieutenant-Colonel Churchill appealed to the right-
wing Conservative MP for Abingdon, Airey Neave, for help. Neave, himself a
famous prisoner of war who had managed to get out of the notorious German
camp at Colditz, took up their case : among the Sachsenhausen claimants were
other escapees, including Dodge and Dowse, of his ‘Great Escape’ from Stalag
Luft III. Neave began his campaign – a battle seemingly motivated by both a
desire to seek justice and to embarrass the government – by seeing junior Foreign
Oﬃce ministers, for instance Eirene White.15 This was a rather disagreeable and
bad-tempered meeting, partly because White suspected Neave’s motives, but also
because of Neave’s behaviour : the civil servant present noted that he quickly
‘ started name-dropping and inferr[ing] that he had wide support on both sides of
the House ’. White informed him that the Claims Department, the legal advisers,
and two under-secretaries had looked into the matter, and she was not going to
gainsay them. Only an oﬀer to meet in person some of the veterans involved was
forthcoming, and three of the complainants did later meet with White in October
1966.16
The new foreign secretary, George Brown, had only been appointed to the post
in August 1966. He was initially sympathetic to Neave’s campaign. ‘It looks a bit
legalistic to me. Why are we so insensitive? ’, he wrote to White. She provided
him with the oﬃcial briefs, which once again reiterated that the men had not
been inside the ‘main’ camp, and that ‘ their treatment had been good compared
with others ’.17 Three days later Brown therefore rebuﬀed an initial Oral Question
by Neave in the Commons. The foreign secretary argued that he had looked into
the question and, although ‘hon. Gentlemen opposite ’ had been responsible for
framing the rules, he could not bend them, however ‘gallant ’ the complainants
may have been.18 Brown’s situation became more diﬃcult when 275 MPs from
all parties signed an Early Day Motion on behalf of the Sachsenhausen twelve.
Neave had already seen Brown on three separate occasions to press his
case, carrying with him both the Early Day Motion and messages of support
13 S. P. Best, The Venlo incident (London, 1950), p. 76.
14 TNA, FCO 64/56, Foreign Oﬃce memorandum, ‘Comparative statements made in 1945 and
1965’, July 1967.
15 On Neave’s campaigning in general see P. Routledge, Public servant, secret agent : the elusive life and
violent death of Airey Neave (London, 2002), pp. 14, 237–40.
16 TNA, FCO 64/62, Littler memorandum, White meeting with Neave, 14 June 1966; TNA, FCO
64/67, Neave to Brown, 26 Oct. 1966.
17 TNA, FCO 64/67, Brown to White, 1 Nov. 1966, White to Brown, 4 Nov. 1966.
18 H. of C. debs., vol. 735, col. 975, Brown, oral answers, 7 Nov. 1966.
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from the Liberal leader Jo Grimond and the previous prime minister, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home. Brown looked into the ﬁles twice more – making three passes
through the paperwork in all – before rejecting the idea of an ex gratia payment
that would leave the government open to compensation claims from many
thousands of prisoners of war.19
Neave and his fellow campaigners decided at this point to refer their case to the
ombudsman, writing to Compton during June 1967. Neave’s view was simple,
telling Compton that whatever the truth about the prisoners’ treatment,
‘Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp consisted of a main compound triangular in
shape with a punishment Cell Block. Within the electriﬁed barbed wire perimeter
there were also two Sonderlager and other accommodation … All parts of the camp
were guarded by units of the SS. ’20 Compton was interested enough in the case to
begin investigating, and set up an oﬃce for both himself and other members of his
staﬀ within the Foreign Oﬃce claims department itself.21
I I I
Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials were initially conﬁdent that they had done all they could.
As one put it : ‘ the Foreign Oﬃce case is a very strong one … The ﬁles will show
that individual cases have been most painstakingly and sympathetically handled
by Claims Department. The Secretary of State has taken a close personal
interest … and has himself been through the ﬁle on more than one occasion’.22
The brief oﬃcials prepared for the PCA and his staﬀ argued that their decisions
had been ‘purely factual ’, based on the aide memoire ‘What is Nazi persecution? ’
The problem with this case was that ‘ inclusion inside a concentration camp’ or
‘ truly comparable treatment … where the conditions were comparable ’ were not
simply ‘purely factual ’ matters – both, and especially the second clause of the
rules, demanded some judgement. Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials concluded, indeed,
that the twelve applicants had mainly been singled out for what they termed ‘VIP
treatment ’ because of the qualities or past that had brought them to
Sachsenhausen in the ﬁrst place. But that very reference to ‘VIP treatment ’
showed that civil servants had looked into their treatment, and had come
to the conclusion that it did not rank alongside the suﬀering inside the ‘main
compound’.23
Compton made it clear very early in his investigation that he did not believe
that oﬃcials had briefed ministers properly about conditions prevailing in
the ‘main’ part of the camp. Only two British servicemen, as opposed to
civilians, survived from what the Foreign Oﬃce thought of as the central part
of Sachsenhausen. Although one, a Sergeant Kemp, was very badly treated,
19 TNA, FCO 64/67, Neave and other MPs to Brown, 7 Feb. 1967, Brown to Neave, 24 Feb. 1967.
20 TNA, FCO 64/56, Neave to Compton, 22 Mar. 1967.
21 TNA, FCO 64/58, Brooks to Hohler, 11 July 1967.
22 Ibid., Hohler to Gore-Booth, 12 July 1967.
23 TNA, FCO 64/56, Foreign Oﬃce brief for Compton, 7 July 1967.
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another, Captain J. A. R. Starr, was only employed in painting huts. This meant
that while the twelve claimants had been denied assistance, another man who had
been much better treated (Starr) had received compensation payments. Compton
argued that ministers had not been informed of this point, which might have
led to a diﬀerent interpretation of the rules. One civil servant, the Foreign Oﬃce
legal counsel J. L. Simpson, who had advised on legal reform in Germany after
the war, risked an angry retort. ‘Most of us who had been concerned with this
distribution had come to it with a considerable background knowledge of con-
ditions in concentration camps’, he told Compton: this had been ‘acquired
through work in Military Intelligence during the war or subsequently in war
crimes trials ’.24
Even more senior oﬃcials were just as perturbed. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the
Foreign Oﬃce’s permanent secretary, told Compton a month later that he ‘could
not agree that there had been maladministration in this case ’. He was not
accusing the ‘honourable persons’ complaining of lying, but simply of lapses of
memory; and despite Compton’s assertion that similar cases had been treated
diﬀerently, the simple fact was that Starr had been in the camp, and those refused
compensation had not.25 Ministers, too, were angry when they saw the draft
report – though, partly because they were necessarily more alive to the political
implications of an open conﬂict with the ombudsman, they were prepared to look
at compromises. Brown had initially been tempted to ‘reject ‘‘maladminis-
tration’’ ’, wanting to ‘ take our stand with several Secretaries of State on both
sides of the House’, though then making an ex gratia goodwill payment.26
His minister of state, Bill Rodgers, found the draft report ‘unconvincing and
superﬁcial ’, and Starr’s report of ‘music and laughter ’ in the main part of
Sachsenhausen deeply unconvincing given that the majority of the Britons sent to
that part of the camp died there.27
Compton’s report was extremely critical. It argued that the department had
placed undue weight on the autobiographies – Churchill, for instance, could
say nothing about the Zellenbau, for he had been in the so-called ‘blister ’ that
contained the Sonderlager to the side of the camp. The Foreign Oﬃce’s defence
was fatally undermined by an aerial photograph, supplied by Neave to the
ombudsman, clearly showing that the Zellenbau was inside the main part of
the camp, and even suggesting that the Sonderlager might also have been.28
Nothing else should have been considered, Compton argued, if the men were in
the camp: but since the whole installation was under the same commandant, and
was treated administratively as a single unit by the Nazi authorities, there
24 TNA, FCO 64/58, Simpson memorandum, ‘Interview with Sir Edmund Compton’,
30 Oct. 1967.
25 TNA, FCO 64/57, Gore-Booth meeting with Compton, minutes, 24 Nov. 1967.
26 Ibid., Gore-Booth to Watts, 26 Nov. 1967. 27 Ibid., Rodgers to Gore-Booth, 14 Nov. 1967.
28 TNA, FCO 64/60, Vallat to Rodgers, 17 Jan. 1968; TNA, FCO 64/62, Smith memorandum,
‘The aerial photographs of Sachsenhausen’, 13 Feb. 1968.
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seemed little doubt that they had been. He therefore accepted the central thrust of
Neave’s campaign.29
This led to what even Brown remembered as a ‘peculiarly bitter debate in the
House of Commons’, during which he stuck to his case that he would not allow
‘personal attacks on Civil Servants ’ and accepted ‘ full responsibility ’ himself.30
Brown now accepted that the twelve applicants had been held in areas that were
actually part of the concentration camp. Some oﬃcials in the Foreign Oﬃce’s
Claims Department disliked compensating the Sonderlager inmates, as their case
was not cut-and-dried from the aerial photograph; still less because four of them
were the Irishmen who had been prepared for anti-British subversion by the
Germans. But accepting the view that the entire ‘ system’ at Sachsenhausen
should now be treated as a whole was the easiest and cheapest manner of
accepting the justice of their cause, which meant that the Foreign Oﬃce might be
able to hold the line in other cases where there was doubt.31 This might have
settled the matter, had the requisite apology been fulsome and unconditional.
Brown went further and was extremely intemperate in this debate, publicly
criticizing Compton’s behaviour in a way that ministers had never done before.32
He had been infuriated by a parliamentary deputation, led by Neave but
also containing the Labour MPs David Ginsburg and John Mendelson, that had
visited him earlier in the day. Neave threatened to reveal what had transpired in
meetings with the Foreign Oﬃce over the past year, while Brown countered that
he had thought these consultations ‘conﬁdential ’. Neave answered that he was
considering raising the case of another 600 POWs who had been poorly treated.
The conversation then grew even more heated. ‘ If by being generous ’, the
foreign secretary told him, ‘he was providing Mr Airey Neave with an excuse to
raise the case of others then he might have to reconsider his decision on
Sachsenhausen inmates ’.33 ‘When the Ombudsman has made enough decisions ’,
he now argued, ‘perhaps we shall have an Ombudsman to look at the
Ombudsman’s decisions, and if he gets 100 per cent right, I shall be surprised. ’34
The temperature having thus been kept up at the pitch of their meeting earlier
in the day, Neave replied that he was not criticizing oﬃcials at all, but rather
Brown’s refusal to set up an independent investigation : ‘ if he had listened to hon.
and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House who saw him 12 months
ago and asked for an impartial inquiry into this matter, we would not be here
today ’.35 Both these arguments were relatively disingenuous. Brown was
attempting to hide behind his civil servants’ anonymity, rather than accept the
29 PCA, Third report for 1967/1968 (London, 1967), pp. 15–17.
30 Lord George-Brown, In my way (Harmondsworth, pbk edn, 1972), p. 143.
31 TNA, PREM 13/2274, Foreign Oﬃce to Palliser, 30 Jan. 1968.
32 R. Crossman, The diaries of a cabinet minister, III : Lord president of the council and leader of the House
of Commons, 1966–1968 (London, 1976), pp. 661–3.
33 TNA, FCO 64/61, Brown meeting with Neave, note for the record, 6 Feb. 1968.
34 H. of C. debs., vol. 758, col. 115, Brown statement, 5 Feb. 1968.
35 Ibid., col. 117, Neave in Sachsenhausen debate, 5 Feb. 1968.
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criticism of his department ; the PCA could not name the civil servants involved
even if he wanted to. The Spectator accused him of ‘stretching the doctrine of
Ministerial accountability to absurdity ’, and in any case, the periodical asked, if
Brown was indeed taking full responsibility, why did he not resign?36 Neave, on
the other hand, was ignoring the fact that Compton’s criticisms mostly related
to events that had happened years before Brown’s own tenure at the Foreign
Oﬃce, rather than referring to Brown’s usually conscientious treatment of the
question since he had come to the Foreign Oﬃce in 1966.
I V
There was a sequel to the ombudsman’s investigation, entirely unwelcome to the
government as ministers believed that paying compensation, and the catharsis of
a parliamentary debate, might prove an end to the aﬀair. Unfortunately for them,
the parliamentary select committee which shadowed the PCA decided to take up
the case as well. The leader of the Commons, Richard Crossman, attempted to
dissuade the committee’s members – and tried to warn Brown that inﬂammatory
rhetoric would make an investigation more likely – but to no avail. Ministers now
attempted to hamper the inquiry as much as they could, for Rodgers and other
ministers in the Cabinet Committee on Procedure believed that they were trying
‘ to re-try a case already investigated by the Parliamentary Commissioner and
then engage in a witch-hunt over certain oﬃcials ’.37
The Fulton Report into the future of the civil service was about to be published
at this point, and it was to recommend much more openness about the staﬀ who
actually made decisions.38 Oﬃcials realized that recent trends in terms of pub-
licizing statistics, dealing with industry and public, as well as media appearances,
made some movement in this direction inevitable. William Armstrong, head of
the civil service, accepted that ‘ this had developed naturally over the past years ’.
But most also agreed with Armstrong in private that they ‘ strongly share[d] …
[his] misgivings about any radical change of doctrine ’.39 Sachsenhausen came at
the worst possible time for a civil service that was already worried about moves
towards more open government. The Staﬀ Side of the national pay and con-
ditions negotiating machinery, and the Society of Civil Servants, eﬀectively the
trade union involved, complained bitterly that civil service anonymity would be
breached.40 The name of the civil servant who had written the initial briefs on the
case in 1965 did indeed emerge, as Neave ‘allowed’ his fellow Conservative MP,
Charles Fletcher-Cooke, to ‘drag’ the name out of him. In fact, this was what
36 ‘The real scandal of Sachsenhausen’, Spectator, 9 Feb. 1968, pp. 3–4.
37 TNA, FCO 64/61, Rodgers to Brown, 5 Feb. 1968, Samuel to O’Neill, 5 Feb. 1968.
38 Cmnd. 3638, Report of the committee on the civil service, 1966–1968, I (London, 1968), pp. 93–4.
39 TNA, CAB 164/640, Armstrong to other permanent secretaries, 20 Jan. 1969, Part to Armstrong,
4 Feb. 1969, Marre to Stevenson, 3 Feb. 1969.
40 TNA, FCO 79/86, Barclay to Larmour, 23 Apr. 1968, Wyatt to Morrison, 26 Apr. 1968; TNA,
FCO 79/87, Osmond to Hay, 30 Apr. 1968.
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Compton himself called in private a ‘nauseating … put-up job’, an arrangement
which the rest of the select committee found distasteful, planned and executed by
Neave and Fletcher-Cooke to put more pressure on the Foreign Oﬃce in the
matter of compensation for ex-servicemen.41
MPs did eventually yield on the question of naming individual civil servants,
though only after the attorney-general had seen its chairman, Sir Hugh Lucas-
Tooth, and warned him that the ‘ﬂexibility and compromise ’ required to make
the system work might not be forthcoming in future if the committee abused it.42
The cabinet had already concluded that they could not yield on the question of
civil service anonymity.43 Paragraphs 439 to 444 of the select committee’s report,
which would have named the oﬃcial involved by printing Neave’s evidence,
were struck out.44 This did not stop the press coverage being, yet again,
uniformly hostile to both the government and the omission of individual
‘names ’.45 Two months later, and just a few days after the publication of the
second Sachsenhausen inquiry, Armstrong warned the select committee of
the atmosphere it had created: ‘ there … is a feeling of worry and disquiet that,
notwithstanding the arrangements that Sir Edmund has made, the whole
thing may be re-opened again and … individuals may be brought out into the
light of day by appearing before this Committee ’. Only permanent secretaries
should be called to give evidence, he argued.46
The whole experience poisoned Compton’s and especially the select commit-
tee’s relationship with the Foreign Oﬃce. Gore-Booth felt driven to oppose any
further concessions.47 He believed the parliamentary commissioner’s staﬀ to have
behaved in a high-handed and arbitrary manner, abetted by the vague term
‘maladministration ’. He told Compton that he ‘had written a Report in exag-
geratedly accusatory language which had compelled Foreign Oﬃce Ministers to
react adversely and to contradict the Report ’. From this the select committee
inquiry, and the imbroglio over evidence and civil service anonymity, had ﬂowed:
‘Sir Edmund’, Gore-Booth reported later, ‘ looked very glum and said that there
was something in what I had said. ’48 The unnamed oﬃcial pursued by the select
41 TNA, FCO 64/64, Baker to Gore-Booth, 1 Apr. 1968; TNA, FCO 79/86, Gore-Booth to
Rodgers, 2 Apr. 1968.
42 TNA, FCO 64/64, Samuel to Beith, 3 Apr. 1968; TNA, FCO 79/86, Rodgers to Brown, 17 Apr.
1968; TNA, FCO 79/87, Samuel to Brown, 1 May 1968. He backed this up in public: ‘Anonymous
civil servants rule defended’, Evening Standard, 15 Aug. 1968, p. 4 ; ‘Sir Elwyn puts case for not naming
civil servants ’, Daily Telegraph, 16 Aug. 1968, p. 5.
43 TNA, CAB 129/135, Crossman memorandum to cabinet, ‘Evidence to be given to select
committees ’, 5 May 1968; TNA, CAB 128/43, cabinet minutes, 6 Feb. 1968.
44 First report from the select committee on the parliamentary commissioner for administration, session 1967–1968:
Sachsenhausen (London, 1968), Neave evidence, 13 Mar. 1968, p. 70.
45 See e.g. ‘Foreign oﬃce in error on Sachsenhausen’, Daily Telegraph, 31 May 1968, p. 19.
46 Second report from the select committee on the parliamentary commissioner for administration, session 1967–1968
(London, 1968), Armstrong evidence, 29 May 1968, pp. 99–100.
47 TNA, HLG 124/348, Gore-Booth to Petch, 4 Nov. 1968.
48 TNA, FCO 79/86, Gore-Booth to Rodgers, 2 Apr. 1968.
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committee complained that he had asked the PCA’s assistant for ‘advance notice
of the questions so that I could brief myself, which he did not do … as I had
received no indication of the line of questioning … I was unarmed and had to rely
on memory during the interview [with the PCA]. ’ He ended his interview feeling
‘ that I was being subjected to something between an interrogation and an
inquisition ’.49
V
The ﬁrst general point to be made about this case study is that ombudsmen met
with the same complexities and dilemmas familiar from other administrative
remedies to Whitehall’s and Westminster’s problems. Two of the key issues raised
were the exact role and nature of those uncertain notions, ministerial account-
ability and civil service anonymity – disputed concepts that also bedevilled the
whole process of ‘eﬃcient ’ civil service reform, the inception of more powerful
parliamentary committees, and then the creation of ‘ standing ’ select committees
for each department in the 1980s.50 Faced with such diﬃculties, Compton and his
immediate successors retreated a little from the more controversial individual
cases – though not from a very gradual accretion of their powers vis-a´-vis central
government, as W. B. Gwyn has long pointed out.51 Although on this occasion
the ombudsman had managed to mobilize parliament and the public behind
him, only three case reports were issued in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the institution’s
operation. The legal pressure group Justice, which had recommended the
creation of the oﬃce in the ﬁrst place, reported in 1977 that Sachsenhausen
was one of the few instances where the PCA’s actions were plainly or widely
communicated to the general public.52
These conﬂicts highlight, secondly, some of the unintended consequences that
plagued all governments’ designs in the ‘golden age’ of fast economic growth, low
inﬂation, and relatively generous welfare policies. For the Labour party had
intended their new parliamentary oﬃcer to bring people and politicians closer
together. Wilson argued in opposition that he wanted the PCA ‘to humanize
the administration and to improve relations between Westminster on the one
hand and the individual citizen ’.53 But what Compton’s ﬁrst high-proﬁle case
actually served to do was further undermine public and experts’ trust in oﬃcials’
competence and honesty, as well as threatening further co-operation between
49 TNA, FCO 64/58, memorandum on ‘Interview with Sir Edmund Compton’, 16 Oct. 1967.
50 M. A. Jogerst, Reform in the House of Commons : the select committee system (Lexington, KY, 1993), esp.
pp. 59–70, 118ﬀ; A. Blick, ‘Harold Wilson, Labour and the machinery of government ’, Contemporary
British History, 20, 3 (2006), pp. 343–62.
51 E.g. W. B. Gwyn, ‘The British PCA: ‘‘ombudsman’’ or ‘‘ombudsmouse’’ ’, Journal of Politics, 35, 1
(1973), esp. pp. 59–60; idem, ‘The ombudsman in Britain: a qualiﬁed success in government reform’,
Public Administration, 60, 2 (1982), esp. p. 183.
52 Justice, Our fettered ombudsman (London, 1977), p. 27.
53 Harold Wilson papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Wilson c. 893, ‘Speech at Stowmarket,
Suﬀolk, 3 July 1964’.
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ombudsman, select committee, and civil servants. The press coverage of this
incident was particularly damaging, and acutely felt, in a Foreign Oﬃce that had
always seen itself as the most prestigious part of the civil service.54
The Sachsenhausen controversy erupted at exactly the same time as the
government was reeling from the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, and
public faith in the continued power and eﬃcacy of the state was being called
into question.55 The parliamentary commissioner’s contest with the permanent
administration came to be seen popularly as another example of apparently good
intentions and high but thwarted ambitions – the third and most general issue
raised by Sachsenhausen.56 These are, of course, some of the core and perennial
problems of governance itself, felt just as much in the relatively neo-liberal 1980s
and 1990s as they had been in the 1960s.57 But it might be just as well to
be reminded of these long-standing quandaries and complexities at a moment
of multiple and profound scepticism as to the good faith – rather than just the
decisions – of politicians in all parties.
54 P. Hennessy, Whitehall (London, 2001 pbk edn), pp. 398–407.
55 D. Blaazer, ‘ ‘‘Devalued and dejected Britons’’ : the pound in public discourse in the mid-1960s’,
History Workshop Journal, 47 (1999), pp. 121–40.
56 On ‘unintended consequences’ in UK economic policy, see e.g. A. Hasel, ‘The governance of
the employment–welfare relationship in Britain and Germany’, in B. Ebbinghaus and P. Manow, eds.,
Comparing welfare capitalism: social policy and political economy in Europe, Japan and the USA (London, 2001),
pp. 146–69.
57 For very similar paradoxes in the market-orientated government systems of the 1980s and 1990s,
see most recently R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Understanding governance: ten years on’, Organization Studies, 28,
8 (2007), pp. 1243–64.
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